The Washington factor

By K.K. Katyal
The Hindu
May 20, 2002

Whether we like it or not, whether we want it or not, Washington's diplomatic engagement with India and Pakistan will be the single most important factor in determining the future shape of the uneasy relationship between the two countries — in particular, whether the present stand-off continues or degenerates into an armed conflict. And the United States has not minced words that it is for restraint.

There is nothing to suggest that either the decision-takers in New Delhi or a large section of the Opposition or the non-official strategic community are particularly averse to U.S. moves. The Indian side makes a distinction between third-party intervention (by the U.S. or, for that matter, any other country), on the one hand, and in the use of leverages by America with Pakistan to secure an end to cross-border terrorism, on the other.

True, the BJP and others in the ruling alliance during last week's debate in Parliament spoke of "moral and diplomatic ambivalence" of the U.S. towards the activities of the militants based in Pakistan and trained by agencies there. True, the Home Minister, L. K. Advani, disclosed what he told the U.S. Ambassador, Robert Blackwill — that India was deeply disappointed by the U.S. stance which only served to encourage Pakistan to continue its proxy war. The Home Minister was categorical in his assurance that "we are not dependent upon others" and that the terrorism menace would be tackled by "our troops, by our people".

These open expressions of anguish and disappointment over the U.S. stance notwithstanding, New Delhi will find itself involved in Washington's diplomatic initiatives. Some moves are already on. What else is the meaning of the long-distance calls by the U.S. President, George W. Bush, to the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, by the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, to the External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, and the South Asia-related flurry of activity in Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad? Or of the planned visit to the subcontinent by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage? We may well see a repeat of the hectic diplomatic processes witnessed in January when the build-up of troops by India on the border with Pakistan caused a scare. As a result of those moves, the Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, came out with his anti-terrorism package, while India refrained from pushing ahead with escalation.

There should be no doubt about America's continued diplomatic involvement in the affairs of the subcontinent, especially when it sees India and Pakistan moving towards the brink. New Delhi may be justified in maintaining that, in the new-found love for Pakistan (in the wake of 9/11), the U.S. was not mindful of India's concerns or that it chose to ignore the wide gaps between Gen. Musharraf's professions and actions. At the same time, it should be possible to make good use of the opportunities presented by America's interest in the area — not through rhetoric but by the marshalling of hard evidence. The U.S. believes — as was indicated by a senior official in a recent interview to The Hindu — that infiltration of militants into Jammu and Kashmir has waned. If the facts are conveyed to Washington, the U.S. should have no difficulty in correcting itself.

An important point to be emphasised is that the objectives of India and the U.S. converge. After all, it was the resolve to strike at the source of international terrorism that prompted the U.S. to proceed against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda. The Taliban has, no doubt, been ousted from power in Kabul, but the top echelons of its leadership as also the Al-Qaeda cadres are intact. Osama, who was to be captured dead or alive, is still around. A good section of these elements is in the tribal belt, near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

As the Washington Post reported the other day, "the major remaining concentrations of Al-Qaeda fighters are in western Pakistan rather than in Afghanistan but Islamabad has resisted U.S. pressure to launch large-scale attacks on them". It pointedly identified the Waziristan area of western Pakistan where they were concentrated. A Pentagon official was quoted as complaining that "our guys haven't been getting the cooperation" requested from the Pakistani Government. Pakistani officials, it was pointed out, had been moving very slowly despite the U.S. offers to provide intelligence, helicopters, Special Operations troops or even conventional military units.

Equally revealing was what the newspaper was told by Pakistani officials that "they fear an internal political backlash, both in the unruly border area and from Islamic extremists across the nation, if they take military action against the suspected Al-Qaeda pockets". They cited another reason — that their military was strained by the ongoing standoff with India. Pakistani officials were conscious that the U.S. could act unilaterally against the terrorist pockets. And if that happens, the U.S.-led offensive on the Pakistani side of the border would mark a major widening of the eight-month-old counter-offensive against terrorism in which overt combat had been restricted to Afghanistan.

There is a tendency in Washington to treat India and Pakistan as co-victims of international terrorism. This is an over-simplification based on the fact that both the countries have experienced terrorist strikes of late. For Al-Qaeda, Gen. Musharraf is as much a foe as the rulers of India and the U.S. That accounts for the Karachi blast that claimed the lives of French personnel, working on a submarine project in Pakistan — or, for that matter, other killings, including those at a church in Islamabad. Barring Al-Qaeda, all militant groups in Pakistan continue to enjoy the support and patronage of the ISI and other Pakistani agencies. Gen. Musharraf's January 12 package was not meant to apply these groups, functioning from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and, as such, Pakistan had sought to claim that its territory was not being allowed to be used as a springboard for terrorist violence in Kashmir. So far as Kashmir-related operations are concerned, there is nothing that divides Al-Qaeda and the other jehadis. If the U.S. is made to grasp this central fact, New Delhi would be able to turn the American "interest" in the subcontinent to its advantage. And to the extent that U.S. pressure on Pakistan works — as it did in January — the danger of an India-Pakistan standoff taking a serious turn would lessen.

America did play a decisive role during the Kargil conflict. That fact was known then but the graphic account of how it all happened is now given by a senior director in the Clinton administration's National Security Council, Bruce O. Riedel. The operative portion of the discussions during the July 4 meeting in Washington between Bill Clinton and the then Pakistani President, Nawaz Sharif, bears repetition — "Mr. Clinton asked Mr. Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really was?... The President reminded Mr. Sharif how close the U.S. and Soviet Union had come to nuclear war in 1962 on Cuba. Did Mr. Sharif realise that even if one bomb was dropped... Mr. Sharif finished his sentence and said it would be a catastrophe. Under intense pressure Mr. Sharif agreed to order a withdrawal, defusing the conflict and the immediate potential for a nuclear exchange."